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INTRODUCTION

The modern employee is surrounded by information. In a
given day, an employee might read or write a report, receive
dozens of e-mails, review business plans or records, or look over
sales invoices. When the employee is done reviewing these documents, he likely saves them on a company server where they
can be accessed anytime. On this server, the employee can access thousands of other documents that have been prepared,
submitted, and saved by fellow employees. For the most part,
these documents reveal nothing more than the day-to-day operations of the company. But what if somewhere in this vast trove
of information lurks evidence that the company is steadily defrauding the US government? And what if the employee could
receive a substantial sum of money for bringing those documents
to light? Should the law allow the employee to take the documents without permission?
This Comment addresses the legal problems that arise
when employees choose to take confidential corporate documents that might reveal fraud against the government and then
use those documents to file suit under the False Claims Act 1
(FCA). The FCA is a federal statute that creates a civil cause of
action against any person who defrauds the federal government. 2 Actions under the FCA may be brought by either the US
attorney general or by private parties suing on behalf of the
United States. 3 FCA suits brought by private parties are described using a set of special legal terms. The actions themselves

t BA 2012, University of Notre Dame; JD Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 31 USC § 3729 et seq.
2 31 USC § 3729(a).
3 31 USC § 3730(a)-(b).
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are referred to as "qui tam" suits, and the private plaintiffs are
termed "relators. 4
In 1986, Congress significantly strengthened the qui tam
provisions of the FCA to further incentivize whistleblowers to
come forward and expose fraud against the government. 5 The
centerpiece of the reform was an increase in the monetary reward for relators who bring successful qui tam suits. 6 The result
was an explosion in the number of qui tam suits, which continues unabated today. 7 However, the 1986 amendments had a second, and possibly unintended, effect. By increasing the financial
rewards available for relators but tying those rewards to the
success of the suit, the FCA amendments encouraged relators to
take any and all possible measures to ensure a favorable verdict.
Perhaps in response to the financial rewards that attach to a
successful suit-and only a successful suit-relators in FCA
suits have occasionally engaged in a process called self-help discovery. Self-help discovery occurs when evidence is gathered
unilaterally by the relator, outside the context of civil discovery
8
and in anticipation of litigation.
Self-help discovery presents its own set of unique legal problems. In particular, if the relator is a current or former employee
suing his or her employer, seizure of documents may violate a
confidentiality agreement signed by the employee. 9 When this
occurs, employers are entitled to bring contractual counterclaims against the relator for breaching the agreement. 10 In this
context, courts must effectively decide whether to enforce the
contract and remedy the breach or to allow the documents to be
used and the qui tam suit to proceed. Courts are currently split
on the issue, using one of three distinct approaches. The first and
largest group of courts holds that public policy voids confidentiality
4 Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v United States, 559 US
280, 283 (2010).
5 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, HR 4827, 99th Cong (May 15, 1986), 2d
Sess, in 132 Cong Rec 22330, 22335 (Sept 9, 1986).
6 See id at 22339 (statement of Mr. Berman) (arguing that the increased monetary
reward "is a critical incentive and reward for persons who come forward with information,
putting themselves at risk on behalf of the Federal Treasury and American Taxpayers").
7 See US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics - Overview *1-2
(Sept 30, 2013), online at http://www.justice.govcivilldocsforms/C-FRAUDSFCA
Statistics.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
8 See Jennifer Purcell, Self Help Discovery: Are You Protecting Your Client and
Yourself?, 24 DCBA Brief 18, 18 (Dec 2011).
9 See, for example, Cafasso v General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc, 2009 WL
1457036, *7-8 (D Ariz).
10 See id at *8.
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agreements in the context of the FCA. 11 A second, smaller group
takes the opposite approach, holding that confidentiality agreements are enforceable. 12 The Ninth Circuit has adopted a third
approach, holding that the admissibility of documents obtained
through self-help discovery turns on the reasonableness of the
13
relator's conduct in relation to the need for the documents.
Making matters more confusing, this third approach does not
appear to have been faithfully followed by the district courts
within the Ninth Circuit. Instead, these courts have adopted the
public policy approach, voiding the confidentiality agreements of
14
relators.
In sum, the law concerning self-help discovery in FCA cases
is both contradictory and confusing. Even worse, the most
common approaches to the issue-the public policy exception
and the contractual rule-are diametrically opposed. The use of
two opposing bright-line rules produces outcomes that are not
cost minimizing, because one of the two rules must produce
higher costs than the other.1 5 In addition, the existence of two
contrary approaches undermines the legislative policies underly16
ing the FCA.
Though the treatment of self-help discovery in FCA cases
has become incoherent, it need not remain so. This Comment
recommends abandoning the two opposing bright-line rules currently applied by most courts and instead proposes a more developed version of the reasonableness test suggested by the
Ninth Circuit. Naturally, some will be skeptical of abandoning
easy-to-apply, bright-line rules in favor of a potentially murky
reasonableness analysis. Such criticism misses the point. This is
not the classic case of rules versus standards, nor is it an area in
which a standard offers significant uncertainty. To that end, this
Comment argues that there are three specific reasons to prefer a
reasonableness analysis in the FCA context.
First, this Comment argues that the rules-versus-standards
argument holds little weight when, as here, courts are currently
applying two opposing bright-line rules. The choice is not between
11 See, for example, Ruhe v Masimo Corp, 929 F Supp 2d 1033, 1039 (CD Cal 2012).
12 See, for example, Zahodnick v International Business Machines Corp, 135 F3d
911, 915 (4th Cir 1997).
13 See Cafasso v GeneralDynamics C4 Systems, Inc, 637 F3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir 2011).
14 See, for example, Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1038-39; Siebert v Gene Security Network,
Inc, 2013 WL 5645309, *8 (ND Cal).
15 See Part III.A.1.
16 See Part III.A.3.
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a single rule and an alternative standard. Rather, it is between
the continued use of two irreconcilable rules and the unifying alternative of a reasonableness standard.
Second, this Comment argues that a reasonableness test
makes sense in the context of the FCA because it is a tried-andtrue method of dealing with self-help discovery. To support that
claim, this Comment discusses the treatment of self-help discovery in employment-discrimination litigation. Courts addressing
the issue in the context of employment-discrimination suits
employ a balancing approach 17 that, when boiled down to its
central components, is similar to the reasonableness test proposed by the Ninth Circuit.
Lastly, this Comment argues that a reasonableness test offers substantial benefits over the use of bright-line rules. A reasonableness analysis allows courts to carefully consider the policy
goals of the legislature and the applicable costs in each case. In
doing so, courts should be able to find the solution that is both
faithful to the statute and cost minimizing in each case.
In order to clearly present each of these arguments, this
Comment proceeds as follows: First, Part I outlines the procedures related to a qui tam suit generally, discusses the modern
explosion of qui tam litigation, and defines the problem of selfhelp discovery in more detail. Part II reviews the approaches
that courts take to self-help discovery in FCA claims, discusses
the current bright-line rules, and notes some problems with the
existing regime. Part III argues that a reasonableness approach
is superior to the current regime-especially because it is likely
to be cost minimizing. Then, with an eye toward FCA cases, it
examines the treatment of self-help discovery in the employmentdiscrimination context. Part III concludes by proposing a model
reasonableness test for use in FCA cases, discussing how such a
test would work in practice and analyzing the question of remedy.
I. QuI TAM SUITS AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-HELP DISCOVERY
This Part discusses the history and process of FCA qui tam
litigation and introduces the problem of self-help discovery. Section A outlines the development of the current qui tam regime
and the modern explosion of qui tam litigation. Section B then
explains the process for bringing a qui tam suit, outlines the
17 See, for example, Niswander v Cincinnati Insurance Co, 529 F3d 714, 725-26
(6th Cir 2008).
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problem of self-help discovery, and discusses why relators might
be tempted to use it instead of civil discovery.
A.

The Modern Explosion of FCA Qui Tam Litigation

Initially enacted during the Civil War, the FCA stood mostly
unaltered for over 120 years.1 8 In the 1980s, however, members
of Congress became concerned about an increase in procurement
abuses accompanying that decade's military buildup. 19 These
concerns led to a set of amendments designed to strengthen the
FCA, particularly its qui tam provisions.
The amendments strengthened private individuals' incentives to bring qui tam suits in two ways. First, the amended
20
FCA created a new antiretaliation cause of action for relators.
Relators could use this new cause of action to sue if they were
retaliated against for any lawful act in furtherance of their FCA
claim, even if the FCA claim itself was unsuccessful. 21 This
change significantly mitigated some of the risks previously associated with whistleblowing 22-most notably the likelihood that
an employee would be fired simply for filing an FCA suit.
In addition, the amended FCA increased awards for qui tam
plaintiffs who brought successful suits. Previously, in suits in
which the government chose to intervene, the qui tam plaintiff
was entitled to receive up to 10 percent of any recovery. 23 The
amendments increased this percentage significantly, to between
15 and 25 percent of the recovery depending on the relator's contribution to the action. 24 The amount recoverable by qui tam
plaintiffs pursuing a suit on their own also increased from a cap
of 25 percent to a payout of between 25 and 30 percent of any

18 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 132 Cong Rec at 22335 (cited in note 5)
(statement of Mr. Glickman) (noting that the FCA had been amended only twice in 123
years).
19

See id.

20 See Sean Elameto, Guardingthe Guardians:Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation
under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 Pub Contract L J 813, 819 (2012). These antiretaliation protections are codified at 31 USC § 3730(h).
21 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-562, 100 Stat 3153, 315758, codified at 31 USC § 3730(h)(1).
22 See Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 817-18 (cited in note 20).
23 Act of Sept 13, 1982, Pub L No 97-258, 96 Stat 877, 978-79, codified as amended
at 31 USC § 3730.
24 False Claims Amendments Act, 100 Stat at 3156, codified at 31 USC
§ 3730(d)(1).

1302

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1297

damages award. 2 5 By providing specified award ranges and increasing the maximum percentages available, the 1986
amendments reduced the ability of courts to minimize payouts
26
to relators.
At the same time, the increase in reward percentages provided a stronger financial incentive for relators to bring qui tam
actions. The new antiretaliation provisions concurrently limited
the downside risk to failed relators, removing some of the fear
that whistleblowers might have felt about coming forward.
Whistleblowing thus became safer and far more lucrative.
As might be expected, the 1986 amendments to the FCA unleashed a flood of qui tam litigation. 2 7 From 1943 to 1986, the
number of FCA qui tam suits was minimal, averaging approximately six per year. 28 Furthermore, in 1987, non-qui tam suits
under the FCA outnumbered qui tam suits nearly eleven to
one. 29 In the two decades following the amendments, the situation has reversed. From 1987 to 2013, the total number of qui
tam suits outnumbered non-qui tam actions by a ratio of just
over two to one. 30 The numbers are even more striking in absolute terms. Over 9,200 qui tam cases have been opened since
1987. These actions have produced $27 billion in settlements
31
and judgments, including $4.2 billion in payments to relators.
In 2013 alone, qui tam suits produced a combined $2.9 billion in
settlements and judgments. 32 Roughly $387 million of that, or
about 13 percent, was paid out to relators. 33 Though the number
of qui tam suits varies from year to year, the explosion of such
litigation shows no signs of abating. The number of qui tam suits
filed increased from an average of 393 per year in the period from
2004 through 2008 to an average of 609 per year in the period
from 2009 through 2013.34 Given the consistent upward trend, it

25 Compare Act of Sept 13, 1982, 96 Stat at 979, with False Claims Amendments
Act, 100 Stat at 3156-57, codified at 31 USC § 3730(d)(2).
26 See Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 818-19 (cited in note 20).
27 See id at 815.
28 Id at 818, citing Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud,76 ABA J 46,
48 (Mar 1990).
29 Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 825 n 96 (cited in note 20).
30 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in note 7).
See also Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 825 n 96 (cited in note 20).
31 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, FraudStatistics at *2 (cited in note 7).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id at *1-2.
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is no surprise that 2013 had the highest number of qui tam suits
35
on record.
B.

FCA Lawsuits and Self-Help Discovery
1. FCA qui tam suits and common relators.

The FCA spells out the procedure for bringing a qui tam action in some detail. 36 When a relator files a qui tam FCA action,
he is required to provide the DOJ with a copy of the complaint
and written disclosure of all material evidence and information
that he possesses.37 These copies are kept under seal. 38 The DOJ
39
then has sixty days to decide whether to intervene in the suit.
If it intervenes, the government assumes primary responsibility
for prosecuting the action. 40 Currently, the DOJ chooses to intervene in about 22 percent of cases. 41 In the remaining cases,
42
the relator has the right to continue the action on his own.
Relators are current or former employees of corporations
that do business with the government. 43 This is not surprising,
given that employees have informational advantages over other
potential relators. Employees are likely familiar enough with
their employers' business to recognize when something seems
awry, and they have access to internal information that may expose fraudulent behavior. 44 The importance of employees to the
FCA whistleblowing scheme is further illustrated by the inclusion of the previously discussed antiretaliation provisions in the
FCA, which apply only if the relator is an employee, contractor,
45
or agent of the entity accused of fraud.

35 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in note 7)
(reporting 753 qui tam suits in 2013).
36 See 31 USC § 3730.
37 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
38 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
39 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
40 31 USC § 3730(c)(1) ("If the government proceeds with the action, it shall have
primary responsibility for prosecuting the action").
41 See Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 826 (cited in note 20).
42 31 USC § 3730(b)(4)(B).
43 See Marc S. Raspanti and David M. Laigaie, Qui Tam Litigation § VII.B (American
Health Lawyers Association seminar materials, Oct 2, 1996), available on Westlaw at
AHLA-PAPERS P10029631; Jeffrey A. Lovitky, Qui Tam Litigation:A PracticalPrimer,
35 Trial 68, 69 (Jan 1999).
44 See Raspanti and Laigaie, Qui Tam Litigation at § VII.B (cited in note 43).
45 See 31 USC § 3730(h)(1).
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2. Self-help discovery.
A separate set of legal issues is implicated when an employee
appropriates confidential documents from his or her employer in
anticipation of a qui tam suit. Impermissible evidence gathering
done in this context-outside the civil-discovery process and in
anticipation of litigation-is termed "self-help discovery." 46 As
used here, the term has a specific and limited meaning. It does
not encompass every unilateral investigation done by a party,
even if that investigation is not fully regulated or authorized by
a federal rule of procedure. 47 For example, a party involved in a
car accident might wish to get a head start on proving what happened and therefore hire a private investigator to photograph the
accident site. If this investigator is hired without prior judicial
approval, the accident participant might colloquially be said to
be engaging in self-help discovery because his act is outside the
judicially sanctioned discovery process. However, just because
the investigation is unilateral does not mean it is impermissible.
The investigation does not contravene any rule, law, or contractual obligation, nor does it invade the rights of other parties. It
48
simply involves a private party investigating his own claim.
This Comment defines self-help discovery differently, limiting it to cases in which the plaintiffs unilateral investigation violates a substantive law, 49 an employer's general information re51
strictions, 50 or a specific contractual obligation of the relator.
The specific focus will be on the latter two scenarios, both of
which entail violation of a contract between the plaintiff and the
entity accused of fraud. Consequently, ensuing uses of the
term "self-help" can be assumed to refer to actions that violate

46 Purcell, 24 DCBA Brief at 18 (cited in note 8).
47 See Allendale Mutual Insurance Company v Bull Data Systems, Inc, 32 F3d
1175, 1178 (7th Cir 1994) (explaining that a party's "right to investigate" is not always
explicitly encompassed by a federal rule).
48 See, for example, Simington v Menard, Inc, 2012 WL 3288745, *3-4 (ND Ind)
(noting that the rules of civil procedure do not prevent parties from legally investigating
their own claims).
49 In severe instances, self-help discovery may be considered theft by the employee.
See, for example, Jackson v Microsoft Corp, 211 FRD 423, 431-32 (WD Wash 2002) (determining that the plaintiffs appropriation of compact discs from Microsoft constituted
theft, and that the plaintiffs subsequent use of the stolen compact discs in preparing his
lawsuit merited dismissal). Likewise, self-help discovery is not generally considered a protected activity. See, for example, Ashman v Solectron Corp, 2008 WL 5071101, *3 (ND Cal).
50 See, for example, Rector v Bon Secours Richmond Health Corp, 2014 WL 66714,
*6 (ED Va).
51 See, for example, Glynn v EDO Corp, 2010 WL 3294347, *1-2 (D Md).
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contractual rights, though the specific rights at issue may be
52
contained in a variety of contractual forms.
Because the existence of a contract necessarily requires
some sort of prior relationship between the parties, self-help
counterclaims based on contractual violations are most likely to
arise in cases in which the plaintiff is or was employed by the
defendant corporation. This means that self-help discovery commonly occurs in FCA qui tam cases and Title VII employmentdiscrimination cases, both of which frequently pit employees
against employers. While self-help discovery can of course occur
in other legal contexts, 53 this Comment focuses on the problem
as it relates to the FCA, drawing on the treatment of self-help dis54
covery in the Title VII context to further inform the discussion.
3. Why engage in self-help?
When an employee appropriates evidence for a qui tam action in violation of a confidentiality agreement, the employer can
sue the employee for breach of contract. 55 The employer might
56
also bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty or conversion.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it is possible that the
employee will be fired for his conduct. On the other hand, an
employee can avoid such unattractive consequences by forgoing
self-help and pursuing normal civil discovery. Assuming that a
relator's case makes it past a motion to dismiss, the relator will
have access to all the traditional discovery tools. This includes
57
the ability to furnish interrogatories and request documents.
Employers may occasionally be able to obtain protective orders
for confidential, privileged, or sensitive documents, but they
likely cannot protect the documents that will be relevant to

52 For example, an employer may include confidentiality obligations as part of an
employment agreement, in a separate confidentiality agreement, or as a condition of a
separation or termination agreement. See Saini v InternationalGame Technology, 434 F
Supp 2d 913, 925 (D Nev 2006).
53 See, for example, Mitchell Co v Campus, 2009 WL 3110367, *2-3 (SD Ala)
(addressing self-help discovery that occurred in a lawsuit over soured real estate
dealings).
54 See Part III.B.
55 See Michael R. Grimm, et al, Courageous Whistleblowers Are Not "Left Out in the
Cold" Legitimate Justifications Exist for Collecting Evidence of False Claims Act Violations,
39 False Claims Act & Qui Tam Q Rev 127, 130 (2005).
56 See id.
57 See 78 Am Jur 3d Proof of Facts §§ 33-38 (2014).
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proving the alleged fraud. 58 Thus, if there is proof to be had, the
relator can likely get it through discovery.
Despite the potentially severe consequences of engaging in
self-help discovery and the alternative of civil discovery, employees
clearly remain tempted to appropriate documents outside of the
normal discovery process. There must be some reason why relators regard civil discovery as a dissatisfying alternative. Though
motives to use self-help discovery vary, 59 the temptation for
most relators is likely twofold.
First, by providing evidence justifying government involvement, self-help discovery may increase the chance that the government will take over the qui tam suit.60 As discussed in the
previous Section, upon filing a qui tam suit a relator is required
to provide the DOJ with any material evidence or information
that the relator possesses.6 1 Because this obligation is triggered
prior to civil discovery, the relator faces pressure to provide convincing evidence at the complaint stage. If the evidence is not
persuasive, the government may decline to intervene. While this
might seem insignificant given that the relator remains free to
continue the case on his own, government intervention is actually
quite important to relators. Government involvement can dramatically impact the relator's chance of recovery and the size of
that recovery. Cases pursued by relators alone are remarkably
62
unsuccessful, suffering from a dismissal rate of 86 percent.
That dismissal rate drops to a mere 5 percent in cases in which
the government steps in, meaning that government intervention
63
may often make or break a relator's case.
The impact of government intervention on the size of recovery is just as staggering. In 2013, cases in which the government
58 See Stephen S. Cowen, Christopher C. Burris, and Jessica J-M Hagen, Transmission of Corporate Documents between the Government and Relators during False

Claims Act Investigationsand Litigation:Are There Any Limits on "Self Help" Discovery
and Government Disclosure of Subpoenaed Materials?,Civil False Claims and Qui Tam
Enforcement *C-11, *C-19 to -24 (ABA-CLE 2010), online at http://www.kslaw.com/
Library/publication6- 10CLECowenBurrisHagen.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
59 See, for example, Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the
Promiseof Title V77, 34 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 529, 530 (2003) (discussing self-help discovery
motivated by subtle discrimination); Laura W. Morgan, Marital Cybertorts: The Limits of
Privacyin the Family Computer, 20 J Am Acad Matrim Lawyer 231, 231 (2007) (addressing
self-help discovery that seeks to avoid liability for the actions of private investigators).
60 See, for example, Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036 at *5 (discussing a government investigator's desire to review documents that might indicate the alleged fraud).
61 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
62 Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 825-26 (cited in note 20).
63 See id.
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intervened produced over $2.8 billion in settlements and judgments. 64 In contrast, cases pursued by the relators alone realized less than $110 million. 65 In other words, cases in which the
government chose to intervene realized about 96 percent of all
qui tam recoveries. 66 Though these discrepancies are probably
due to the fact that the government selects the most promising
and high-profile cases for intervention, 67 the fact remains that
the relator has an incentive to make the case appear promising
at the outset. Even if the case turns out to be a dud, the government might still be able to obtain a more favorable settlement than the relator could have alone.
The fear that the government will ignore a whistleblower
who fails to present substantial evidence of wrongdoing is far
from unrealistic. The infamous Bernie Madoff case presents a
compelling example. As is now common knowledge, Madoff ran a
prominent investment firm that was exposed in 2008 as a massive Ponzi scheme.68 Losses totaled up to $65 billion. 69 Madoff
ultimately pled guilty to running the scheme and was sentenced
to 150 years in prison.7 0 After the case was resolved, reports surfaced that investment analyst Harry Markopolos had repeatedly
tipped off the SEC about Madoffs investment activities, beginning as early as 2000.71 Markopolos lacked direct evidence of the
fraud but provided the SEC with calculations showing that
Madoff's returns were mathematically impossible based on financial statements and the market.7 2 The SEC, however, ignored
Markopolos.7 3 Though Markopolos did not report any FCA violations, the point remains that the SEC failed to act even when
repeatedly presented with compelling logic and potentially
massive losses. Markopolos was not a Madoff employee with the
chance to appropriate inside documents showing fraudulent
64 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in note 7).
65

Id.

66 Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 826 (cited in note 20).
67 See text accompanying notes 75-77.
68 Diana B. Henriques and Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests a Top Trader in Vast
Fraud,NY Times Al, Al (Dec 12, 2008).
69 Diana B. Henriques and Jack Healy, Madoff Jailed after Pleading Guilty to

Fraud,NY Times Al, A17 (Mar 13, 2009).
70 Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, NY Times Al, Al
(June 29, 2009).
71 Daniel M. Gold, The High Human Cost of Following the Money in the Madoff
Fraud Case, NY Times C12, C12 (Aug 26, 2011).
72

Id.

73 Id. For a comprehensive account of Markopolos's whistleblowing, see generally
Harry Markopolos, No One Would Listen: A True FinancialThriller(Wiley 2010).
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practices, but had he been in such a position, it is hard to imagine
him resisting the temptation to do so. In light of Markopolos's
experience, FCA relators are justified in their fear that, without
appropriated documents proving fraud, they simply will not be
believed.
Second, engaging in self-help discovery may allow a relator
to survive a motion to dismiss, especially given the heightened
pleading standard for fraud actions.7 4 Motions to dismiss occur
before discovery, meaning that whatever evidence might be discoverable later is of no help to a relator. Though there is no direct evidence that engaging in self-help discovery improves one's
chances of surviving a motion to dismiss, the 86 percent dismissal rate for qui tam cases in which the government does not intervene suggests that dismissal is a legitimate fear. 75 Indeed,
the dismissal rate for individually pursued qui tam actions is
about 10 percent higher than the average dismissal rate for civil
actions.7 6 Of course, these statistics may be somewhat misleading.
The particularly high rate of dismissal for individually pursued
qui tam suits is doubtless a partial product of the intervention
process, which removes promising suits from the pool. Even so,
at least one case has suggested that access to insider information
77
is the easiest way to plead an FCA claim with particularity.
Relators with access to this information consequently have an
incentive to take it. Relators may fear that if they do not, their
cases will suffer a one-two punch-refusal to intervene followed
by dismissal.
4. The legal posture of FCA self-help-discovery cases.
The fact pattern in the typical FCA self-help-discovery case
usually looks something like the situation in Cafasso v General
Dynamics C4 System, Inc.7 8 In Cafasso, the relator appropriated
documents from her employer, General Dynamics, after learning

74 See FRCP 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
75 See Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 826 (cited in note 20).
76 See Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96
Judicature 127, 132 (Nov-Dec 2012) (finding a dismissal rate of about 77 percent for all
civil suits).
77 See Clausen v Laboratory Corporationof America, 290 F3d 1301, 1314-15 (11th
Cir 2002) (dismissing the relator's suit for pleading merely conclusory allegations but
noting that, as a corporate outsider, the relator was in a poor position to obtain the inside information about billing practices that might be required).
78 2009 WL 1457036 (D Ariz).
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that she was about to be discharged. 79 Once her discharge became official, the relator filed a qui tam suit for improper retaliation under the FCA.80 The relator claimed that she was investigating fraud, a protected activity under the FCA.8 1 In the
process, she turned the documents over to her attorney.8 2 General Dynamics pled six counterclaims, including breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty.8 3 The two sides
84
then filed cross motions for summary judgment.
The court therefore faced two distinct but interrelated legal
questions. First, it had to decide whether the relator's qui tam
suit had a chance of victory on the merits. Second, it had to determine whether the confidentiality agreement had been
breached. Though each claim is technically distinct, in practice
the resolution of the first claim relies heavily on the resolution of
the second. Finding for the employer on the contractual claim
would require the court to award a remedy, which would typically
involve clawback of the documents by the employer or some sort
of monetary damages.8 5 Clawback would typically make it impossible for the employee to win at trial, and damages awards
would presumably negate or reduce the incentive to bring a qui
tam suit in the first place.8 6 Clawback might also lead to dismissal of the suit if the plaintiff cannot satisfy the particularity requirement for pleading fraud without the documents.8 7 In short,
the remedy awarded for the contractual claim would almost certainly negate-or at least make less remunerative-the qui tam
suit even if it survived summary judgment.

79
80
81
82

Id at *5-6.
Id at *8.
Idat*11.

84
85

Id.

Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036 at *13.
83 Id at *8.
See, for example, Saini, 434 F Supp 2d at 925 (ordering an employee, in the context of a discrimination suit, to return "confidential and proprietary" documents).
86 See, for example, Glynn v Impact Science & Technology, Inc, 807 F Supp 2d 391,
431 (D Md 2011) (ordering the relator to pay nearly $90,000 in damages). Though contract
damages are likely to be less than the financial reward for a successful qui tam suit, they
may be greater in terms of expected value. Dismissal rates for FCA qui tam suits are
high and win rates are low, as discussed in the previous Section. If the probability of being
forced to pay damages for self-help discovery is high, then the expected value of an FCA
suit based on self-help discovery might run into the negative. Put another way: (contract
damages x chance of being ordered to pay damages) might be greater than (relator
award x chance of a successful suit).
87 See FRCP 9(b). For an analysis of the requirements of Rule 9(b) in an FCA case,
see Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1037-38.
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Because the answer to the contractual question significantly
affects the odds that the qui tam suit will succeed or even be initiated, it is helpful to focus primarily on the contractual counterclaim. The court's ruling on that claim-especially the remedy
that it chooses to award-will almost always dictate the outcome
of the qui tam suit. The general rule applied to the contractual
counterclaim also has an impact on the ex ante incentives to engage in self-help discovery. If the employee knows that he will
never be able to use the documents and may face damages, he
will be much less likely to appropriate them in the first place.
Relators also may not come forward at all, especially if they
think that the government will not believe their claims without
supporting documentation.

II. AN INCOHERENT APPROACH: THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF
SELF-HELP DISCOVERY IN FCA CASES

Courts are currently divided over how to treat contractual
counterclaims when an FCA relator has engaged in self-help discovery. Courts' interpretations can be placed into three groups:
First, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a reasonableness test, holding that the admissibility of documents obtained via self-help
discovery turns on the reasonableness of the relator's conduct in
relation to his need for the documents.8 8 A second set of courts
has held that confidentiality agreements are void in the face of
an FCA suit, explaining that the public policy interest in combating fraud outweighs the employer's interest in confidentiality.8 9
Lastly, a third group of courts has taken the opposite position,
holding that confidentiality agreements are enforceable even in
the face of qui tam suits. 90
This Part outlines these three different approaches. It also
addresses the remedies that courts award when they conclude
that confidentiality agreements are enforceable.
A.

The Ninth Circuit Reasonableness Test

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Cafasso v General Dynamics
C4 Systems, Inc 91 offers a unique approach to the problem of

See Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
See, for example, Ruhe v Masimo Corp, 929 F Supp 2d 1033, 1039 (CD Cal 2012).
90 See, for example, Glynn v Impact Science & Technology, Inc, 807 F Supp 2d 391,
424-25 (D Md 2011).
91 637 F3d 1047 (9th Cir 2011).
88
89
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self-help discovery. In that case, the relator seized thousands of
documents in violation of a confidentiality agreement with her
employer. 92 The employer then sued to recover the documents,
93
and the relator filed an FCA suit in district court two days later.
The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt a broad public policy exception based on the factual circumstances of the case, instead leaving the issue open. 94 The court stated that, in order to qualify for
such an exception, an aspiring relator would need to explain "why
removal of the documents was reasonably necessary to pursue
an FCA claim."95 The court then applied this test to the relator's
conduct, determining that her seizure was "overbroad and unreasonable. '96 Central to this conclusion was the fact that the relator
indiscriminately copied tens of thousands of documents, sweeping
up not only those related to the alleged fraud, but also documents
that contained confidential attorney-client communications, trade
secrets, internal research, sensitive government information,
and at least one sealed patent application. 97 The court worried
that if a public policy exception were applied in these extreme
circumstances, all confidentiality agreements would be unen98
forceable so long as the employee later filed a qui tam action.
Based on this concern, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of
summary judgment for the employer. 99
What merits attention in the Ninth Circuit's opinion is not its
resolution of the case, but rather its reasoning regarding self-help
discovery. In particular, the Ninth Circuit's decision suggests
that courts should employ a reasonableness analysis in FCA
self-help-discovery cases.10 0 The court thoroughly explained that
this was not a holding, expressly stating that it reserved deciding on the existence of a public policy exception "for another
day."'101 The Ninth Circuit did, however, establish a framework
for evaluating the potential application of a public policy exception. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit focused on the reasonableness of the relator's conduct in relation to the need for the
92

Id at 1052.

93

Id.

94 Id at 1062 ("Although we see some merit in the public policy exception that Cafasso
proposes, we need not decide whether to adopt it here.").
95 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
96 Id.
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.

100 See id.
101 Id.
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appropriated documents. 10 2 The court explained that future relators would need to justify why the removal of documents was
"reasonably necessary to pursue an FCA claim" and suggested
that lower courts consider "in particular instances for particular
documents whether confidentiality policies must give way to the
103
needs of FCA litigation for the public's interest."
Two features of the Cafasso test are particularly important.
First, the test is amenable to two alternative readings. The
Ninth Circuit did not focus on reasonableness in the abstract, but
rather on "why removal of the documents was reasonably necessary to pursue an FCA claim."10 4 While this might seem like a
straightforward requirement, the precise meaning of "reasonably necessary" is unclear. One possible reading is that the appropriated documents must simply be necessary to prove the
fraud allegation-meaning that they must be highly probative.
A second, stronger reading is that the actual taking of the documents via self-help discovery must be necessary. The documents would still need to be relevant to proving the claim, but
simple relevance would not excuse the self-help discovery.
A close reading of the opinion yields two clues that suggest
that the Ninth Circuit meant to adopt the second, stronger
meaning of "reasonably necessary." The first clue comes from
the court's conclusion that the relator's actions were not reasonably necessary: the court tersely explained that the need to pursue a valid claim "does not justify the wholesale stripping of a
company's confidential documents. ' 10 This language suggests
that self-help discovery is not excused simply because it targets
evidence relevant to the qui tam claim. The relator must have
some special justification that goes beyond a desire to prove her
case. The court's determination that the relator's appropriation
of documents was "overbroad and unreasonable" contains a second clue. 10 6 Specifically, the use of the word "and" implies that
the relator's conduct was problematic for two independent reasons. The self-help discovery was overbroad because it involved
the seizure of thousands of irrelevant documents, and it was unreasonable because it lacked a justification beyond the need for
proof.

102

See id.

103 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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In sum, Cafasso implies that, in order to fall within a public
policy exception for self-help discovery, a relator would need to
show two things: (1) that the appropriation of documents was
reasonable, meaning that it was narrowly tailored to documents
related to the suit; and (2) that it was necessary to use self-help
discovery to obtain the documents. Though the Ninth Circuit did
not suggest what level of necessity is required, or whether the
existence of any alternative options (like civil discovery) defeats
a necessity claim, this Comment argues that the treatment of
self-help discovery in employment-discrimination litigation of10 7
fers a few possibilities.
The second important feature of the Ninth Circuit's framework is its indication that courts should consider the balance of
interests in "particular instances."'0 8 The use of this phrasing, as
opposed to a call for a weighing of interests in all cases, implies
that the Ninth Circuit envisioned district courts approaching
self-help discovery on a case-by-case basis. Had the court intended to adopt a bright-line rule, it would have used different
language.
Altogether, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cafasso is best
read to suggest that a case-by-case reasonableness test should
be applied to self-help discovery in FCA cases. This test would
take into account both the reasonableness and necessity of the relator's conduct. However, regardless of the Ninth Circuit's intentions, it does not appear that district courts within the Ninth Circuit have since applied such a test. Rather than balancing the
interests or considering reasonableness, these courts have
sketched out bright-line public policy rules. The following sections outline those decisions.
B.

Courts Permitting Self-Help Discovery on Public Policy
Grounds

Authority for an FCA public policy exception' 09 to confidentiality agreements appears mostly in district court decisions.
107 See Part III.B.1.
108 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
109 A public policy exception is possible in this instance because of Supreme Court
precedent permitting federal courts to void a contract when it restricts the use of a federal cause of action. Otherwise, state contract law would govern. The governing case is
Town of Newton v Rumery, 480 US 386 (1987), which considered the validity of a contractual waiver that would have effectively barred the plaintiff in the case from bringing
a § 1983 suit. Id at 390-91. The Court held that, when an agreement purports to waive a
right to sue conferred by a federal statute, whether the policies underlying the law may
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This Section outlines each of those decisions, focusing primarily
on their common framework.
Two particularly strong applications of the public policy doctrine can be found in district courts within the Ninth Circuit following Cafasso. These two courts ignored the Ninth Circuit's call
for reasonableness, instead interpreting Cafasso to permit an
FCA public policy exception to confidentiality agreements.
Ruhe v Masimo Corp,110 decided just one year after Cafasso,
was the first lower court decision to ignore the Ninth Circuit's
suggested approach. In Ruhe, two relators copied documents
from their work hard drives in violation of confidentiality
agreements.' 1 ' They then used those documents to support an
FCA qui tam suit against their former employer, claiming that
the employer had encouraged fraudulent billing of the government. 112 The employer tried to exclude the documents, arguing
that allowing their use would be "scandalous and impertinent"
because the documents were seized in violation of a confidentiality agreement. 113 The district court disagreed, holding that the
taking was not wrongful given the "strong public policy in favor
of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against the government."" 4 The court cited Cafasso to support this position,
claiming that the Ninth Circuit had "stated that public policy
merits finding individuals such as Relators to be exempt from
liability for violation of their nondisclosure agreement."' 115 As
discussed in the previous Section, the Ninth Circuit said no such
thing. Rather, the Ninth Circuit explained that, while it saw
"some merit in the public policy exception... [the court] need not
decide whether to adopt it here."116 The Ninth Circuit then went on
to delineate its reasonableness analysis." 7 The district court
ignored this too. It neither mentioned nor applied the Ninth

render the waiver unenforceable is a question of federal law. Id at 392. The Court instructed
that such questions are to be answered "by reference to traditional common-law principles."
Id. The justices described the operative principle as follows: "[A] promise is unenforceable if
the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
harmed by enforcement of the agreement." Id.
110 929 F Supp 2d 1033 (CD Cal 2012).
111 Id at 1038.
112 Id at 1035.
113 Id at 1038.
114 Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1039, quoting United States v Cancer Treatment Centers
of America, 350 F Supp 2d 765, 773 (ND 11 2004).
115 Ruhe, 929 F Supp at 1039,

116 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
117 Id.
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Circuit's instruction to consider whether the relator's conduct
was reasonable.118
The outcome of Ruhe was reproduced in Siebert v Gene
Security Network, Inc.119 In Siebert, the district court considered
the now-familiar situation of a relator who took documents from
his former employer in violation of a confidentiality agreement. 120 The court concluded that any antidisclosure obligation
was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 121 It reasoned
that enforcing the agreement might frustrate the congressional policy embodied in the FCA-the encouragement of
22
whistleblowing.1
Several district courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have also
held that there is an FCA public policy exception to confidential123
ity agreements. The first such decision came in Doe v X Corp,
in which the relator-an in-house attorney-took documents
from his client for use in a qui tam suit. 124 Though it ultimately
concluded that the relator had failed to follow proper qui tam
procedures, the district court noted that public policy favored
125
permitting relators to disclose fraud against the government.
Going further, the court stated that, once a relator has disclosed
documents to the government, the documents may also be disclosed to the public unless the defendant corporation can show
"some significant interest that outweighs the presumption of
public access."'1 26 In other words, the FCA public policy exception
to confidentiality not only permits disclosure to the government,
127
it also creates a presumption in favor of disclosure to the public.
118 See Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1039.
119 2013 WL 5645309 (ND Cal).
120 Id at *2.
121 Id at *8. Interestingly, the court did caution that the agreement might have been
violated if the documents taken "bore no relation" to the FCA claim. Id. This might be a
nod to reasonableness, but in context it is more sensibly read to suggest that there is
simply no public policy interest in documents irrelevant to an FCA claim. No other court
adopting the public policy exception has suggested this limitation, however, which might
give credence to fears about abuse of such an exception. Specifically, employers might
claim that an unlimited exception allows employees to steal documents and then get
away with it by filing a frivolous FCA claim.
122 Id. See also False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 132 Cong Rec at 22330 (cited
in note 5).
123 862 F Supp 1502 (ED Va 1994).
124 Id at 1503.

125 Id at 1508.

126 Id at 1510-11 (quotation marks omitted).
127 Even if any documents were kept permanently under seal (unless the relator
prevailed), corporations would still worry about the potential for additional unauthorized
disclosures. Some risk of disclosure remains so long as the relator or his attorney has
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The Northern District of Illinois echoed this decision, articulating a similarly broad rule in United States v Cancer Treatment
128
Centers of America.
Most recently, in Head v Kane Co, 129 the District Court for
the District of Columbia considered an FCA relator who took
documents from his employer in violation of a separation agreement. 130 The court opted to dismiss the employer's counterclaims
under the agreement, holding that enforcement of the agreement
would frustrate the statutory requirement that FCA relators turn
over all evidence in their possession to the government.13 1 The
district court explained that any confidentiality agreement that
prevented the disclosure of evidence of fraud against the gov13 2
ernment would be void under public policy.
Altogether, the cases discussed in this Section stand in favor
of a strong FCA public policy exception to confidentiality agreements. The decisions expressly permit an FCA relator to disclose
confidential documents to the government under almost any
circumstances. Some courts also imply that the documents may
ultimately be disclosed to the public. Consequently, these cases
render the employer's confidentiality contracts null and void
when the FCA is involved.
C.

Courts Restricting Self-Help Discovery on Contractual
Grounds
1. The contractual rule and its rationale.

Not all courts agree that confidentiality agreements between employers and employees are void in the face of an FCA
suit. This Section outlines decisions that take the opposite tack
and hold that confidentiality agreements are enforceable in the
face of FCA claims.

access to the documents, even if the court has ordered them sealed. See, for example,
Grove Fresh Distributors,Inc v John Labatt Ltd, 888 F Supp 1427, 1452 (ND Ill 1995)
(imposing sanctions on an attorney for disclosing confidential documents in violation of a
court order).
128 350 F Supp 2d 765, 773 (ND Ill 2004) (holding that a "confidentiality agreement
cannot trump the FCA's strong policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud
against the government").
129 668 F Supp 2d 146 (DDC 2009).
130 Id at 149-50.
131 Id at 152.
132

Id.
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in Zahodnick v International
Business Machines Corp 133 is representative. In Zahodnick, the
relator was an IBM and Lockheed employee who came across
what he believed were improper billing practices.1 34 The relator
claimed that, after reporting the activities to management, he
faced retaliatory action that ultimately led him to resign. 135 After
his resignation, the relator brought suit under the whistleblowerprotection provisions of the FCA.136 The relator supported his
claim with documents taken from Lockheed in violation of two
separate confidentiality agreements, and Lockheed counterclaimed for breach of contract.137
The Fourth Circuit found against the relator on all claims, affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the employer.1 38 Addressing the issue of confidentiality, the court
explained that "the district court did not err either in enjoining
[the relator] from disclosing Lockheed's confidential materials to
third parties or in ordering [the relator] to return all confidential
materials to Lockheed."'139 The court did not even discuss the
40
possibility of an FCA public policy exception.
At least two district courts have followed the contractual
approach of Zahodnick. In Glynn v Impact Science & Technology,
Inc, 41 the District Court for the District of Maryland evaluated
42
another suit under the antiretaliation provisions of the FCA.1

133 135 F3d 911 (4th Cir 1997).
134 Id at 913.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Zahodnick, 135 F3d at 915.

138 Id at 914-15.
139 Id at 915.

140 In contrast to many of the cases discussed in Part IIB, Zahodnick dealt with the
antiretaliation provisions of the FCA rather than the fraud provisions. See id at 914.
However, this is not a satisfactory ground on which to distinguish or explain away the
Zahodnick case. Adequate protection is essential to any public policy that seeks to incentivize whistleblowing. Consequently, it would not make sense to interpret the FCA as
allowing whistleblowers to share confidential documents while simultaneously exposing
them to retaliation for doing so. Such a reading would put the various statutory provisions at cross purposes and dampen the larger aims that the public policy courts claim
that the FCA serves. For this reason, Zahodnick is thematically akin to a bright-line
contractual rule. See, for example, Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1039 (explaining that the
FCA embodies a strong public policy in favor of whistleblowing). See also Eletta Sangrey
Callahan and Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38
Am Bus L J 99, 100-04 (2000) (discussing both incentive-based and antiretaliation
means of encouraging whistleblowing).
141 807 F Supp 2d 391 (D Md 2011).
142 Id at 398.

1318

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1297

The court concluded that the plaintiff had breached the confidentiality obligations imposed by his employment agreement
and that the employer was entitled to damages.143 The court further determined that the confidentiality obligations in the plaintiff's employment agreement were valid under state contract
law. 144 It did not consider whether federal law might void the
contract on public policy grounds. 145 The Fourth Circuit affirmed
and was also completely silent on the contractual counterclaims.146

A similar outcome obtained in the district court decision in
Cafasso, though its rationale was superseded by the Ninth Circuit's subsequent ruling in the case.1 47 The district court's discussion of the issue is still worth noting, however, because it
considered and rejected the idea of creating an absolute public
policy exception in favor of the relator. Specifically, the district
court held that the FCA's incentives for whistleblowers "do not establish a public policy in favor of violating an employer's contractual confidentiality and nondisclosure rights."1 48 The court
then qualified this statement, adding that confidentiality
agreements might be unenforceable if they substantially interfere with the filing of an FCA qui tam action.149 But even if the
district court's decision is best considered as opening the door to
a limited public policy exception, it still stands in contrast to the
absolute public policy regime adopted by most courts. It also
contrasts with the Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision, which
was more favorable to the creation of a public policy exception.
For these reasons, the lower court decision is best understood as
adopting a loose contractual rule.
Because the contractual-rule courts have not substantially
engaged with the arguments advanced by the public policy
courts, it is hard to tell precisely what motivates the contractual
approach. However, the likely answer is that the contractualrule courts are animated by a concern that permitting self-help
discovery in FCA cases would enable unscrupulous employees to
143 Id at 424, 431.
144 Id at 423-24.
146 See Glynn, 807 F Supp 2d at 423, citing ACAS Acquisitions (Precitech), Inc v
Hobert, 923 A2d 1076, 1084 (NH 2006).
146 Glynn v EDO Corporation,710 F3d 209, 218 (4th Cir 2013) (failing to reach the
contractual issues and affirming the lower court's disposition).
147 Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036 at *14, revd, Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
148 Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036 at *14.
149 Id.
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steal documents and then avoid the consequences by filing frivo150
lous FCA claims.
2. Remedying self-help.
When a contractual-rule court finds that a confidentiality
agreement has been breached, it must then consider whether to
award a remedy. The remedy (or remedies) selected is important, both for the outcome of the immediate lawsuit and for
its effects on future relator conduct. 15 1 This Section provides
background for that discussion, offering a survey of the remedial
blends awarded in contractual-rule cases.
Employers seeking to enforce confidentiality agreements
against relators typically seek injunctive relief. When injunctive
relief has been granted in FCA suits, it usually includes clawback of the documents by the employer and an order forbidding
further disclosure. 152 It is no surprise that corporations typically
prefer injunctive relief, as it has the obvious benefit of protecting
proprietary information and shielding the company from further
litigation based on the documents.
In addition to ordering injunctive relief, contractual-rule
courts have sometimes awarded monetary relief in the form of
attorney's fees or damages. In Cafasso, the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the district court's grant of injunctive relief and its
award of attorney's fees to the employer, though only with respect to the employer's successful contractual claim. 53 The court
took care to express its concern that a fee award might "chill
prospective relators from exposing frauds on the government,"
but concluded that the misconduct of the relator ultimately outweighed those concerns. 54 Likewise, the district court in Glynn
determined that the employer was entitled to recover damages
equal to the amount that it expended recovering the confidential
5
documents that the relator had appropriated.
150 See, for example, JDS Uniphase Corp v Jennings, 473 F Supp 2d 697, 702-03
(ED Va 2007) (discussing the concern that permitting the use of documents obtained via
self-help discovery would enable document thieves to protect themselves with frivolous
whistleblowing claims).
151 See Part III.
152 See Zahodnick, 135 F3d at 915; Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062-63; Saini v International Game Technology, 434 F Supp 2d 913, 925 (D Nev 2006); JDS Uniphase, 473 F
Supp 2d at 704-05.
153 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1061-63.
154 Id at 1062-63.
155 Glynn, 807 F Supp 2d at 427-32.
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III. TOWARD A REASONABLENESS TEST
The above discussion of current law reveals that courts have
failed to develop a consistent approach to self-help discovery in
FCA qui tam litigation. This Part offers a solution to the current
divide. Section A discusses the problems resulting from the current divided approach and the advantages of switching to a reasonableness approach. Section B then proposes that courts adopt
a reasonableness test to evaluate self-help discovery by relators.
This test, which is based on the Ninth Circuit's test in Cafasso
and the tests used in employment-discrimination cases, requires
courts to weigh the need for the documents against the disruption caused by taking them. This Part then concludes by demonstrating how the proposed test should be applied.
A.

The Advantages of Reasonableness

This Section addresses the problems with the current approach to self-help discovery and argues that there are two reasons to prefer a reasonableness test to either of the current
bright-line rules. These reasons are: (1) the likelihood that a
reasonableness test would minimize the combined costs of fraud
and self-help discovery, and (2) that a reasonableness test is
more sensitive to the competing policy concerns that arise in
FCA self-help-discovery cases.
1. Costs of the current regime.
The existing legal regime is problematic from an economic
perspective. Both of the current rules are inflexible, meaning
that they can lead to costly outcomes in certain situations. For
example, a contractual rule may be costly in a case in which a
company defrauds the government of millions of dollars, and any
attempt to expose the fraud will prompt the company to destroy
all related evidence. Because a contractual rule leaves no room
for necessity, the relator will likely be deterred from coming forward, and the fraud will remain unexposed. If the employee
56
comes forward without the documents, he may not be believed'
and will probably be fired. But if he takes the documents, he will
face a lawsuit, injunction, and possible damages. Facing a loselose scenario, the relator will probably do nothing. Indeed, this

156 The risk that a whistleblower who lacks documentary proof will not be believed
is far from speculative, as the Bernie Madoff case demonstrates. See Part I.B.3.
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is precisely what aspiring relators did prior to the addition of
antiretaliation provisions to the FCA in 1986. Before the 1986
amendments, whistleblowing under the FCA was almost always
a losing proposition. Relators feared that if they came forward,
the government would do nothing, and their employers would
then fire them in retaliation. 157 Many relators will likely behave similarly if self-help discovery is not protected in some
circumstances.
A bright-line public policy rule can be equally costly. If no
fraud is actually occurring, but the employee uncovers documents that he believes show fraudulent behavior, then nothing
is gained from permitting the employee to engage in self-help
discovery. Allowing the employee to take the documents will expose no fraud, but the employer will suffer the disruptiveness of
the employee's actions, the cost of litigation, and potential exposure of trade secrets and business strategies. 158 A bright-line
public policy rule ignores all of this and simply admits the
documents into evidence despite the costly loss imposed on the
employer.
As these examples show, the current rules are quite flawed in
certain situations. The bright-line public policy rule may incentivize unnecessary self-help discovery, imposing costs on employers
in the form of lost confidentiality and uncertainty. On the other
hand, the bright-line contractual rule might deter some whistleblowers from coming forward, allowing fraud against the government to go undetected. Even worse, the contractual rule
would not allow self-help discovery even if the relator discovers
that the documents are about to be destroyed and the fraud covered up. If the wrong rule is applied, the list of potential costs is
long.
The problem, however, is not that rules can produce costly
outcomes in certain circumstances. That much is obvious and is
part of the endlessly debated issue of rules versus standards. 159
Moreover, bad outcomes from the two rules are uncommon because most situations are not as extreme as the two described
157 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 132 Cong Rec at H 6483 (cited in
note 5) (statement of Mr. Berman) (defending the 1986 FCA amendments with evidence
showing that relators were too fearful to come forward under the then-current FCA).
158 See, for example, Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062 (noting that the relator's "unselective
taking of documents" swept up privileged communications, trade secrets, internal research,
sensitive government information, and at least one patent application).
159 See, for example, Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 Duke L J 557, 596-99 (1992).
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above. For proof of this, one need look no further than a few of
the actual cases. The application of a contractual rule in Ruhe
would not have been disastrous, as the appropriated documents
were contained in only two exhibits and were relevant but not
crucial to the relators' claims.1 60 Likewise, applying a public policy rule might not have imposed catastrophic costs on the corporation in Zahodnick because there was no indication that the
documents taken by the relator contained any particularly sen161
sitive information.
Rather, the real question is whether fraud or excessive selfhelp discovery is the more costly social problem. Fraud against
the government and disruptive breaches of confidentiality
agreements both impose social costs. The former increases the
cost of government contracts and services, while the latter increases the cost of doing business. But no one, including the
courts and the litigants, knows which set of costs is larger.
Consequently, one of the two bright-line rules currently in
use must be objectively more costly than the other. A bright-line
rule would make sense only if courts could be confident that one
rule or the other produced preferable outcomes most of the
time. 16 2 But without empirical data or an explicit legislative
finding on the issue, courts lack this confidence. They stand on
uncertain ground when they adopt bright-line rules one way or
the other. Moreover, courts are remarkably ill suited to pick a
rule in the first instance by guessing what the universe of future
FCA cases will look like, when all that courts have to go on is
the case in front of them. For this reason, a balancing approach
that permits courts to weigh the costs based on the facts of each
case will likely lead to a more accurate set of decisions.
2. Reasonableness and cost minimization.
Implementing a reasonableness test would likely help solve
the problem described above and could prevent at least one
group of courts from persisting in error. By affording flexibility,
a reasonableness test would allow a court to admit or bar documents based on the facts before it. Courts could admit the
160 Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1038 (discussing the exhibits only after concluding that
the complaint could survive a motion to dismiss). See also Part I.B.
161 See Zahodnick, 135 F3d at 913-15. See also Part II.C.1.
162 For a discussion of the problem of using bright-line rules when the court either
does not or cannot understand the background social problem, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L J 943, 953-58 (1987).
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documents if the fraud costs were higher than the disruption
costs caused by self-help discovery or exclude them if the reverse
were true. So long as courts are capable of recognizing whether
fraud costs or confidentiality costs are larger in a particular case,
the preferable rule would almost always be applied. 163 In fact,
courts are sometimes asked to assess these costs in FCA cases.
The court must already assess the cost of the fraud if it decides
to award damages, and it may be required to evaluate the monetary harm that self-help discovery inflicts on the employer if the
164
employer prevails on its contractual counterclaim.
Balancing inquiries of this sort are thought to be cost minimizing in a number of other legal contexts-such as when courts
decide whether to issue a preliminary injunction165-and there is
no reason why the same would not be true here. A reasonableness approach would not make self-help discovery costless, as
the court would still have to impose some fraud costs on the government or some disruption costs on the employer, but this approach would allow the court to impose only the lower of those
two costs. By minimizing the sum of fraud and disruption costs
in each case, the reasonableness approach would ultimately
yield the lowest aggregate cost across all cases.
Two objections might be made to this argument. First, it is
possible that courts are not good at applying a reasonableness
test and will frequently fail to find the cost-minimizing approach. However, this objection has equal force with respect to
either of the bright-line rules currently in use. If courts are not
good at identifying the cost-minimizing option, we should have
no more confidence in their ability to select a bright-line rule in
the first instance than in their ability to apply a reasonableness
163 While some might object that evaluating costs entails a partial weighing of the
merits at the motion to dismiss stage, it can be analogized to the inquiry into the likelihood
of success on the merits that occurs when a court decides to issue a preliminary injunction.
See, for example, BUC International Corp v International Yacht Council Ltd, 489 F3d
1129, 1137-38 (l1th Cir 2007) (assessing the likelihood of prevailing on the merits in a
copyright case).
164 If the qui tam suit is successful, 31 USC § 3729(a)(1)(G) requires the court to calculate the amount of harm that the government has suffered from the fraud. And if the
employer wins on its contractual counterclaim, it may ask the court for monetary damages.
See, for example, Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062-63. So long as courts are trusted to perform
these tasks, there is little reason to criticize their ability to make rough estimates of the
likely magnitude of these costs at an earlier point in the litigation.
165 See William F. Patry, 6 Patry on Copyright § 22:62 (Thomson 2013) (discussing
cost-minimizing balancing in copyright law); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and
Mary Kay Kane, 11A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.3 (Thomson 2d ed 2013)
(discussing preliminary injunctions generally).
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approach. Moreover, a reasonableness test has the advantage of
limiting error to the case at issue, whereas adoption of an erroneous bright-line rule sets a precedent that later courts will likely
follow. A reasonableness test therefore limits the damage in the
event that the initial decision is incorrect and is likely preferable
so long as courts get it right a majority of the time.
Second, one could argue that any cost savings from reasonableness are negated by a potential increase in litigation costs
and uncertainty costs. The logic of this argument is that even a
bad rule would cabin judicial discretion and provide certainty to
the parties, and that these benefits would outweigh the improvement in substantive outcomes offered by a reasonableness
test.166 This argument is correct to an extent, as it is true that a
bright-line rule would be easier for courts to apply and would
probably reduce the cost of litigation. In the context of self-help
discovery, however, these types of savings are probably not substantial enough to justify maintaining a bad rule. Unlike many
legal issues, self-help discovery is typically litigated prior to discovery, in conjunction with a motion to dismiss. 167 The additional
cost of litigating a prediscovery issue is likely to be small compared to the general cost of litigation, meaning that the potential administrative savings from a bright-line rule are minimal.leb Given that the costs of fraud or disruption can be
astronomical, 169 continuing with a bright-line rule would save a
penny on litigation but cost a pound in substantive losses. Moreover, under a reasonableness test, courts would be able to dismiss

166 For a thorough discussion of this type of pro-rule argument, see Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1179 (1989) ('There are times
when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.").
167 See, for example, Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1051; Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1035-39;
Siebert, 2013 WL 5645309 at *1-2.
168 A recent study found that discovery costs accounted for nearly one-fourth of all
outside legal fees paid by major corporations, supporting the claim that prediscovery litigation is significantly less costly. See Lawyers for Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform
Group, and US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Litigation Cost Survey of Major
Companies: Appendix 1 *2 (Civil Litigation Conference, Duke Law School 2010), online
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules[Duke%20Materials/Library/
Litigation%20Cost%2OSurvey%2Oof%2OMajor%2OCompanies.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 12 (1984) (arguing
that the use of standards increases the cost of litigation in antitrust cases, primarily by
increasing the cost of discovery). This suggests that, if most cases can be dismissed before discovery, the cost impact of a standard will be less significant.
169 See, for example, Glynn, 807 F Supp 2d at 430-31. See also Diana B. Henriques,
The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust 215 (Times 2011) (describing
some of the costs of Madoffs fraudulent scheme).
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truly frivolous suits, further limiting litigation and uncertainty
costs.
3. Reasonableness and policy.
A reasonableness test also better accommodates the competing policy interests implicated by self-help discovery. As the public policy courts consistently note, the FCA evidences a strong
legislative policy of encouraging whistleblowing and combating
fraud. 170 A contractual rule pushes in the opposite direction,
permitting employers to silence relators via confidentiality
agreements. 171 Consequently, public policy courts are rightly
concerned that enforcement of a contractual rule undermines
72
the whistleblowing incentives that Congress meant to create.
In contrast, courts taking the contractual approach usually
mention the general public policy in favor of protecting confidentiality and honoring contracts. 73 These courts worry that a public
policy exception undermines the fundamental precepts of contract law, giving relators a license to breach confidentiality and
break contracts. 174 These concerns are just as valid as those of
the public policy courts, but simply focus on a different set of legislative values.
The current regime of bright-line rules forces courts to
choose between these two sets of legitimate policy values. When
courts adopt a bright-line contractual or public policy rule, they
are implicitly holding that one set of policy concerns merits full
protection and that the other merits none. The bright-line courts
consequently ignore the alternative set of legislative policy
goals, instead choosing the goals that they each think are more
important.
In contrast, a reasonableness test would permit courts to
consider both sets of values. By weighing the costs of fraud
against the costs of disruption from self-help discovery, courts
would effectively be testing the strength of each set of policy
concerns in the case before them. The strongest policy interest in
each case could then be protected, instead of privileging the

170 See, for example, Ruhe, 929 F Supp 2d at 1039.
171 See id ("Obviously, the strong public policy would be thwarted if [the defendant
corporation] could silence whistleblowers and compel them to be complicit in potentially
fraudulent conduct.").
172 See, for example, Siebert, 2013 WL 5645309 at *8.
173 See, for example, JDS Uniphase, 473 F Supp 2d at 702-03.
174 See, for example, id.
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same policy interest in all cases. For this reason, a reasonableness approach is more faithful to the competing legislative policies. Courts would no longer be forced to choose between contractual and antifraud goals.
B.

A Reasonable Solution: Adopting the Ninth Circuit's Test

Adopting a reasonableness test solves the problems with the
current legal treatment of self-help discovery. The test proposed
by the Ninth Circuit in Cafasso is a helpful starting point, and it
provides the basic inquiry that courts should conduct. The Ninth
Circuit suggested that a public policy exception should apply to
self-help discovery only if the relator can show "why removal of
the documents was reasonably necessary to pursue an FCA
claim.' 75 Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did not explain precisely how to evaluate either the reasonableness or the necessity
of the relator's conduct. At best, the court implied that the documents seized should relate to the alleged fraud, and that selfhelp discovery should be the only feasible way to obtain the documents. 176 Without more, the Ninth Circuit's suggested test
offers little more than vague guideposts.
Fortunately, the treatment of self-help discovery in
employment-discrimination cases offers a number of possibilities
for filling in the Ninth Circuit's proposed reasonableness test. In
those cases, courts have developed a series of balancing tests to
determine whether the taking of documents is a protected activity.
These balancing tests consider a number of interests but typically
focus on the reasonableness of the relator's conduct.
This Section draws on the balancing tests used in
employment-discrimination cases to propose a model reasonableness test for use in FCA cases. To that end, this Section first
discusses the treatment of self-help discovery in employmentdiscrimination cases. Then, drawing from the Ninth Circuit's
test in Cafasso, it proposes a model test that focuses on the
reasonableness of the relator's conduct as well as the balance of
fraud and disruption costs. After articulating the proposed reasonableness test, this Section provides an illustration of how the
test should be applied. It concludes with a discussion of the remedies that should be awarded in the event that a court decides to
honor the confidentiality agreement.
175 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
176 For further discussion of the Cafasso test, see Part II.A.
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1. Self-help discovery in employment-discrimination cases.
a) Why consider employment-discrimination suits? The
balancing test used in employment-discrimination cases provides
a particularly apt model for an FCA reasonableness test. Both
tests share a focus on the reasonableness of the relator's conduct, and each statute considers similar interests. Indeed,
employment-discrimination cases address the same basic public policy conflicts as FCA cases. In the employmentdiscrimination context, courts evaluating self-help discovery
must weigh the interest in combating discrimination against the
disruptive effect that self-help discovery may have on the employer. 177 Similarly, if a reasonableness test were adopted in the
FCA context, courts would balance the public interest in combating fraud and the relator's need for the documents against the
harm that the self-help discovery causes the employer. 178 In
light of these similar policy interests, courts in employmentdiscrimination cases have already identified many of the factors
that should be considered when evaluating the utility and disruptiveness of self-help discovery. 79 These factors are equally applicable in the FCA context, especially if the inquiry is likewise
focused on the reasonableness of the relator's conduct.
Perhaps more importantly, the focus on reasonableness in
employment-discrimination cases supports the adoption of a
reasonableness approach in FCA cases. The use of similar reasonableness regimes in each statute would harmonize the treatment
of self-help discovery in federal law, bringing uniformity to a
currently haphazard treatment. Standardization would also create a common pool of precedent for courts and litigants to draw
on when evaluating self-help discovery, further clarifying the issue.
b) The Title VII balancing approach. Self-help discovery
is a well-considered problem in employment-discrimination litigation under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964180 and
state antidiscrimination laws.1 8 '

177 See, for example, O'Day v McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co, 79 F3d 756, 763
(9th Cir 1996); Kempcke v Monsanto Co, 132 F3d 442, 445-46 (8th Cir 1998).
178 See Part III.B.2.
179 See, for example, Niswander v Cincinnati Insurance Co, 529 F3d 714, 726 (6th
Cir 2008).
180 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 253-66, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
181 See Purcell, Self Help Discovery, 24 DCBA Brief at 18-20 (cited in note 8)
(providing an overview of how this issue plays out in state law).
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As with FCA qui tam actions, litigants in employmentdiscrimination cases sometimes take or disclose confidential
documents from their employers and then use those documents
to pursue discrimination claims. 8 2 If the employee is then fired
for having taken the documents, the court is usually called on to
decide whether disclosure of the documents was a protected activity under the applicable employment-discrimination law.18 3 In
the event that the court decides that taking the documents
was protected, the employer is potentially liable for improper

retaliation. 184
Most federal discrimination suits involving self-help discovery arise under Title VII. Like the FCA, Title VII contains both
substantive and antiretaliation provisions. The substantive provisions prohibit discrimination in hiring, 8 5 and the antiretaliation provisions bar employers from retaliating against employees who have "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" related to an employment-discrimination claim.' 8 6 Consequently, if
an employee seizes documents in order to assist with a discrimination claim under the statute, Title VII may protect the employee from retaliatory action. 87
To determine whether the protections of Title VII apply to employees who engage in self-help discovery, federal courts have developed a series of balancing tests. 8 8 These tests focus primarily
on the reasonableness of the employee's conduct 8 9 but also
weigh the competing policy goals of combating discrimination
and maintaining employer control over personnel. 90 However,
two of the Title VII self-help-discovery cases go further, carefully
articulating criteria that can be used to evaluate the reasonableness and necessity of employee self-help discovery. These two

182 See, for example, Laughlin v Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 149
F3d 253, 256-57 (4th Cir 1998).
183 See, for example, id at 258.
184 See, for example, id at 258-59.
185 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
186 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
187 See, for example, Niswander, 529 F3d at 722-29 (explaining when disclosure of
confidential documents qualifies as protected activity).
188 See, for example, Laughlin, 149 F3d at 259-60; O'Day, 79 F3d at 763; Kempcke,
132 F3d at 445-46.
189 See, for example, Laughlin, 149 F3d at 260 (stating that Title VII "was not intended
to immunize insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive behavior at work").
190 See, for example, id at 259.
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decisions, outlined below, offer the most useful models for evaluating self-help discovery in the context of the FCA.
First, in Jefferies v Harris County Community Action Association,191 the Fifth Circuit expanded the general balancing approach by identifying three specific situations in which breaching a confidentiality agreement might be necessary. 192 By
highlighting that the plaintiff had not established that (1) the
employer might have destroyed the documents had the employee
not acted, (2) the employee reasonably believed that he needed to
act as he did, or (3) existing grievance procedures were inadequate, the court seemed to imply that these factors would render
a breach of confidentiality acceptable. 193 These three factors
helpfully illustrate circumstances in which seizing documents
might be necessary to a relator's case.
Building on the Fifth Circuit's approach, the Sixth Circuit developed a sophisticated balancing test that can be used to judge
the reasonableness of self-help discovery. This approach was outlined in Niswander v Cincinnati Insurance Co,' 9 4 in which the
plaintiff was fired for disclosing confidential corporate documents to her attorneys in the course of pursuing a class action
sex discrimination claim.195 The plaintiff then filed an individual
suit claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII, and the employer counterclaimed for conversion of the documents. 196 The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer on the
Title VII claim but found for the plaintiff on the conversion
claim. 197 The plaintiff then appealed dismissal of the Title VII
198
claim.
The Sixth Circuit seized on the appeal as an opportunity to
clarify the appropriate test for determining whether self-help
discovery is protected under Title VII. 199 Rejecting the Fourth
191 615 F2d 1025 (5th Cir 1980).
192 Id at 1036.
193 See id.

194 529 F3d 714 (6th Cir 2008).
195 Id at 717-18.
196

Id.

197 Id at 719.

198 Niswander, 529 F3d at 719.
199 See id at 726 ("Based on the analysis applied by the courts in the cases discussed
above, we believe that the following factors are relevant in determining whether
Niswander's delivery of the confidential documents was reasonable."). It is worth noting
that the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the Fourth Circuit's two-step approach, holding
instead that in cases involving self-help discovery, a balancing test applies regardless of
whether the employee's conduct is categorized as participatory or oppositional. See id at 725.
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Circuit's limited approach in Zahodnick, the court created its
own multifactor balancing test. The Sixth Circuit began by explaining that "[t]he ultimate question under the balancing test
is whether the employee's dissemination of confidential documents was reasonable under the circumstances."' 200 To provide
further guidance to district courts, the Sixth Circuit then articulated six factors that are relevant to the reasonableness determination. Specifically, the court recommended that district judges
consider:
(1) [H]ow the documents were obtained, (2) to whom the
documents were produced, (3) the content of the documents,
both in terms of the need to keep the information confidential and its relevance to the employee's claim of unlawful
conduct, (4) why the documents were produced, including
whether the production was in direct response to a discovery request, (5) the scope of the employer's privacy policy,
and (6) the ability of the employee to preserve the evidence
in a manner that does not violate the employer's privacy
201
policy.
The court explained that its test is designed to account for the employer's interest in keeping its employment and agency documents confidential while still protecting the employee's potential
need to copy and disseminate the documents. 20 2 Applying the
test to the facts of the case, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs activity was not reasonable under Title VII.203 In so ruling,
the court noted that the plaintiff might have obtained the information by other means and explained that it was reluctant to give
employees an incentive to intentionally rifle through confidential
20 4
documents in hopes of finding support for future litigation.
The evolution of the Title VII balancing approach to selfhelp discovery offers a useful roadmap for courts adjudicating
future FCA claims. The Niswander case in particular provides
helpful color to key concepts, exploring in detail what it means
for a relator's conduct to be reasonable or for self-help discovery

200 Id.
201 Id at 726. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a similar test in the context of a

sex discrimination suit brought under the New Jersey Law against Discrimination, NJ Stat
Ann § 10:5-1 to -42. See Quinlan v Curtiss-WrightCorp, 8 A3d 209, 227-29 (NJ 2010).
202 Niswander, 529 F3d at 726, citing Jefferies, 615 F2d at 1036.
203 Niswander, 529 F3d at 727.
204

Id.
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to be necessary. 20 5 Furthermore, the workability of balancing in
Title VII cases shows that a reasonableness regime is a feasible
way to address self-help discovery in FCA cases. 20 6 The following
Section builds on these ideas and uses the Title VII balancing
approach to fill in a reasonableness test for self-help discovery in
FCA cases.
2. Refining reasonableness: a model test.
The move toward a reasonableness test in FCA cases should
begin with the test developed by the Ninth Circuit in Cafasso.
Courts currently applying one of the two bright-line rules should
simply adopt the facial holding of Cafasso, permitting the use of
documents obtained via self-help discovery only when the relator's conduct is "reasonably necessary" to the pursuit of his FCA
claim. 20 7 In doing so, courts should consider whether the confidentiality policies of the employer "must give way to the needs of
20
FCA litigation for the public's interest."
Shifting to the Cafasso reasonableness regime would be
easy from a legal standpoint, because it would at most require
reversing a handful of district court decisions. Only district
courts have applied a public policy exception, 20 9 meaning that
the circuit courts could easily overrule them and implement a
reasonableness approach. This is also mostly true for courts applying the contractual rule, with the obvious exception of the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in Zahodnick.2 10 However, because
Zahodnick did not explicitly consider the possibility of applying
a public policy exception, 211 the Fourth Circuit could implement
a reasonableness test without upsetting explicitly established
precedent. In short, the field is wide open for a reasonableness
approach.

205 For an example of a case finding in favor of the employee, see Kempcke, 132 F3d
at 446-47.
206 For criticism of the Title VII balancing approach, see generally Brianne J. Gorod,
Rejecting "Reasonableness"-A New Look at Title VIl's Anti-retaliationProvision, 56 Am
U L Rev 1469 (2007); Nicholas M. Strohmayer, Note, Drawing the Line: Niswander's
Balance between Employer Confidentiality Interests and Employee Title VII AntiretaliationRights, 95 Iowa L Rev 1037 (2010); Eric Ledger, Note, Relevance Is Irrelevant:
A PlainMeaningApproach to Title VII Retaliation Claims, 44 Akron L Rev 583 (2011).
207 Cafasso, 637 F3d at 1062.
208 Id.
209 See Part II.B.

210 See Zahodnick, 135 F3d at 915.
211 See Part II.C.1.
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The practical obstacles to a reasonableness approach are
more substantial but would also be easy to overcome. Because
the Ninth Circuit's reasonableness test has never been applied
by a lower court, valid questions remain about what precisely
makes relator conduct reasonable or necessary. Courts adopting
the Ninth Circuit's test should simply ask the same basic questions that are used in the employment-discrimination context.
Indeed, courts need look no further than the Sixth Circuit's
Niswander test and the three potential factors identified by the
Fifth Circuit in Jefferies.212 By slightly reworking the six-factor
test from Niswander, it is possible to identify four basic questions that courts reviewing self-help discovery in the FCA context should ask. Each question gets at the reasonableness of the
relator's conduct in relation to the need for the documents and
then frames the ultimate inquiry in terms of the balance of public
and private interests at stake. No single question is dispositive,
but each tilts the balance toward or away from reasonableness.
First, courts should ask how the employee came into possession of the documents. After ascertaining the relevant facts,
courts should consider whether the methods used by the employee were either disruptive to the employer's business or illegal. If so, then this factor points toward enforcing the confidentiality agreement. But if not, then this factor counsels in favor of
exempting the employee from the agreement on public policy
21 3
grounds.
Second, courts should ask why the employee chose to appropriate the documents and then assess the strength of those reasons. This factor favors permitting self-help discovery only if it
was necessary-that is, it was the only feasible way to obtain
the documents. To evaluate necessity, courts should consider the
three specific situations identified by the Fifth Circuit: (1)
whether the employer might have destroyed the documents, (2)
whether the employee reasonably believed that he needed to act
as he did, and (3) whether existing grievance procedures were
inadequate. 2 14 The court should inquire whether the discovery was
215
motivated by a desire to expose fraud or by unrelated reasons.
212 See Niswander, 529 F3d at 726; Jefferies, 615 F2d at 1036.
213 The focus on disruption is adopted from the general balancing cases discussed in
Part III.B.1. See Laughlin, 149 F3d at 260; Jefferies, 615 F2d at 1036; O'Day, 79 F3d at
763; Kempcke, 132 F3d at 446.
214 See Jefferies, 615 F2d at 1036.
215 See, for example, Glynn, 807 F Supp 2d at 400 (describing facts suggesting that
the relator may have engaged in self-help discovery to obtain proprietary information
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The court should also consider whether there were reasonable
alternative means to obtain the documents, namely civil discovery. 2 16 When the relator is not motivated by a desire to expose
fraud or could have easily obtained the documents through civil
discovery, this factor counsels enforcement of the confidentiality
agreement. Lastly, this step entails asking whether the documents were related to the alleged fraud. If they were not, then
taking them cannot have been necessary.
Third, the court should examine what the relator did with
the documents. If the relator gave the documents only to his
counsel or the government in pursuance of the FCA suit, this indicates reasonableness and favors allowing self-help discovery.
In contrast, if the relator shared the documents with coworkers,
the press, third parties, the public, or others unrelated to the litigation, this factor recommends enforcing the confidentiality
217
agreement.
Fourth, the court should consider the impact of the disclosure on the employer. This requires examining the documents
and assessing whether disclosure would disrupt or harm the
employer's business. Documents that contain trade secrets,
business strategies, or confidential financial information should
generally remain protected, while documents that expose fraud
but do little else to harm the employer should generally be al2 18
lowed in the suit.
Once the court has considered each factor individually, it
should balance all of the factors in light of the competing policies
embodied in the FCA. The primary goal of this step is to determine whether the interest in exposing fraud outweighs the employer's confidentiality interest in the specific case. As a secondary matter, the court should consider the broader ramifications of
its decision-namely, how its decision would affect the reporting

that he then used to form a start-up to compete with his former employer); Saini v International Game Technology, 434 F Supp 2d 913, 917-18 (D Nev 2006) (noting that the
plaintiff seized documents to support his paid testimony as an expert witness in a case
against his former employer).
216 For an example of a case in which destruction of documents was suggested as a
possibility, see Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036 at *6. If such a situation arises, the court will
have to consider whether the risk of destruction is real, perhaps by ordering limited discovery to see if the company actually did attempt to cover its tracks.
217 For an example of the type of disclosure this factor would seek to discourage, see
E.A. Renfroe & Co v Moran, 249 Fed Appx 88, 89 (11th Cir 2007).
218 See, for example, Quinlan, 8 A3d at 229 (weighing the impact that disclosure
would have on the employer and finding it to be negligible).
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of fraud and the incentives for relators to come forward. 219 That
said, most cases will not have a broad systemic impact. The
court should typically keep the inquiry focused on whether the
four factors indicate that the fraud costs or confidentiality costs
are greater in the given case. The idea is not for the court to
simply tally up the factors on each side but rather to focus on
the facts that are most important for weighing these two potential costs. This means that factors directly indicating necessity
or reasonableness-such as the scope of the self-help discovery
or the contents of the documents-should be most important.
Peripheral considerations such as the relator's motives should
matter less, and concerns about the effect of the decision on future relators should matter least.
3. Applying the test.
To further illustrate the benefits of the reasonableness approach, it is helpful to examine how the test would affect the
outcome in a case decided under one of the bright-line rules. In
Siebert, the district court applied a bright-line public policy exception and found the relator's seizure and use of confidential
documents permissible. 220 If the proposed reasonableness test
had been applied instead, the court would likely have reached
the opposite result.
In Siebert, the relator left his employer amicably pursuant
to a separation agreement in which he promised to return all
22 1
files belonging to the company and to maintain confidentiality.
Less than a month after leaving, the relator filed a claim under
the FCA. 222 He alleged that his employer had engaged in fraud
to obtain National Institutes of Health grants from the government. 223 He supported the suit with confidential documents that
he had obtained via unauthorized access to his employer's
computer system and that were not related to his employment
2 24
duties.

219 Though some relators may be unaware of the background legal rules and consequently unaffected by rule changes, it is safe to assume that at least some will be affected
by legal incentives. And even if future relators are completely nonplussed by the legal
regime, this does not prevent the court from weighing the costs in the case before it.
220 Siebert, 2013 WL 5645309 at *8.
221 Id at *2.
222

Id.

223 Id at *1.

224 Siebert, 2013 WL 5645309 at *2.
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Examining the reasonableness of this relator's conduct using
the above four-prong test suggests that the confidentiality
agreement should have been enforced. The first factor counsels
slightly in favor of enforcing confidentiality. Though the relator
did not obtain the documents disruptively, he accessed them by
entering a computer system without authorization and outside
the scope of his employment. Factor two cuts the same way,
suggesting disapproval of the self-help discovery. It appears
from the facts that the relator could have easily obtained the
documents in civil discovery and that obtaining the documents
via self-help was not necessary to secure government intervention or avoid dismissal. 225 The relator had sufficient knowledge
to allege or relate the contents of the documents and there was
no reason to believe that the documents would have been destroyed. There was also a chance that the relator took docu226
ments unrelated to the alleged fraud.
In the relator's defense, it does appear that he acted only for
the purpose of exposing fraud. However, good motives should not
excuse what is otherwise objectively unreasonable conduct.
Permitting a motive to be used as a trump card would create an
easy out for relators as it would be difficult for businesses to
prove that the relator's thoughts were otherwise. Likewise, a focus
on motives would reduce the incentive for relators who believed
that they were acting in good faith to take care with their disclosures. Put simply, reasonableness would be discouraged.
Continuing through the test, factor three suggests that the
relator's conduct should be protected. No evidence indicated that
the relator used the documents for anything other than pursuing
his FCA suit. 227 Factor four is neutral, as it does not appear
that the employer had a strong confidentiality interest in the
exposed documents. The documents did not contain trade secrets
or other information that might assist competitors. Finally, it is
unlikely that a decision against the relator would have adverse
systemic effects. While the relator brought a valid claim, a decision against him would not deter additional relators from coming forward. It appears from the facts that the relator chose to
breach his severance agreement and retain the confidential documents after he had already decided to bring suit. 228 Future
225 See Part I.B.3.

226 See Siebert, 2013 WL 5645309 at *8.
227 See id at *6.
228 See id.
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relators in the same situation would simply come forward with
their complaint and then obtain the documents legally in civil
discovery.
Considering all the questions together, the proposed balancing test favors honoring the confidentiality agreement and
granting the employer's counterclaims. The employee's conduct
was not reasonable because it was unnecessary and overbroad.
Civil discovery would have been a perfectly acceptable alternative, and exposing the alleged fraud did not require taking the
documents. The overbroad scope of and lack of justification for
the self-help discovery outweigh the opposing factors, making it
clear that the relator's conduct was neither reasonable nor necessary. The result here demonstrates that a reasonableness test
successfully provides more protection for employers than exists
under the current bright-line public policy rule.
The suggested reasonableness test would also change the
result in contractual-rule cases. The facts of JDS Uniphase Corp
v Jennings229 serve as a good example of the sort of circumstances
which might suggest reasonable relator conduct. In that case,
the whistleblower took documents that were related to the alleged misconduct, claimed that the documents might have been
shredded had he waited for discovery, and filed his claim before
his employer took any adverse action. 230 While the actual whistleblower was unable to prove his claim of necessity, 23 1 proof
that the employer might destroy the documents would likely
have been enough to support a finding of reasonableness. The
necessary seizure of relevant documents is the sort of behavior that
courts should facilitate. A reasonableness test would therefore
achieve its aim of moderating the decisions of the bright-line
courts, finding the appropriate outcome in each individual case.
4. Remedies under a reasonableness approach.
The individual tailoring enabled by a reasonableness test
should also extend to the contractual remedies available to employers. A sophisticated treatment of remedies is a useful complement to the test proposed by this Comment, as it can reinforce the moderating incentives of a reasonableness approach.

229 473 F Supp 2d 697 (ED Va 2007).
230 Id at 698-701.
231 Id at 704.
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Contractual-rule courts have previously granted three types
of remedies in FCA self-help-discovery cases: injunctive relief,
monetary relief, and attorney's fees. 232 Adoption of a reasonableness test does not compel any changes to the current remedy
scheme, though it is important to note how each remedy protects the interests at stake and affects the incentives of relators
to come forward in the first place.
Injunctive relief is the presumptive remedy in self-helpdiscovery cases and, as a matter of practice, appears to be universally awarded by contractual-rule courts and balancing
courts that side with the employer. 2 3 This would remain the
same under a reasonableness approach. Injunctions against further disclosure provide the bare minimum of relief necessary to
vindicate the contractual interests of the employer and to limit
further damage. Under a reasonableness approach, if the court
determines that there are potentially significant confidentiality
costs to exposure, ordering clawback of the documents will be
necessary to remove the risk of additional harm. However, injunctive relief may not affect relator incentives or deter improvident self-help discovery. If a relator must return the documents
taken but is then allowed to proceed to discovery and re-obtain
them, honoring the contract produces little value for the employer and does little to deter future self-help discovery.
Despite these concerns, injunctive relief will normally be
enough to deter improper self-help discovery. If unreasonable
self-help discovery is restricted by the courts, relators will presumably come to understand that self-help discovery can harm
their substantive FCA suits. Documents that must be returned
are of no use in getting to discovery or encouraging the government to pick up the case. In short, relators will change their
thinking when considering self-help discovery. Routine injunctive relief will undermine the belief that self-help discovery is
beneficial and will teach aspiring relators that taking documents
unnecessarily is not worth the extra hassle and cost of litigating
the issue-especially given the easy alternative of civil discovery
234
and the risk of getting fired for the self-help discovery.

232 See Part II.C.2.
233 See Part II.C.2.
234 These issues are discussed at length in Part I, which lays out the risks of engaging in self-help discovery and the link between the contractual and substantive FCA
claims.
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However, in particularly egregious cases, courts may wish to
consider monetary relief in the form of either damages 235 or a fee
award. In cases in which self-help discovery threatens the revelation of important secrets or is extremely disruptive to the employer, simple injunctive relief may not sufficiently deter this
problematic relator conduct. Monetary relief may also be preferable if the relator acted in bad faith, took documents unrelated
to the alleged fraud, or bypassed legitimate avenues of dispute
resolution. Lastly, monetary relief may be necessary in the rare
case in which a relator engages in egregious self-help discovery
but nonetheless survives dismissal or summary judgment based
on other evidence. Failure to award damages in such a case
would allow relators who have secured legitimate sources of evidence to then engage in self-help discovery without suffering a
meaningful penalty.
Awarding damages in extreme cases fits with the overall
goal of the reasonableness scheme. Damage awards would deter
the most expensive types of confidentiality breaches and encourage moderation of relator behavior. Some reporting of fraud
might be lost, but only in the extreme cases in which courts can
be relatively sure that confidentiality costs outweigh fraud costs
in any event. Adjusting the remedy based on the egregiousness
of the relator's conduct has the additional benefit of compensating the employer for harms unrelated to the disclosure of confi236
dential documents.
However, these positive benefits attach only if monetary
damages are strictly limited to instances of egregious conduct.
To extend them to every case would risk deterring potential relators because they would fear owing substantial sums of money
if they turned out to be wrong. 237 So long as the use of monetary

235 For a model of how such damages might be calculated, see Glynn, 807 F Supp at
427-31.
236 For an example of these types of harms, see id at 431 (noting that the employer
incurred nearly $90,000 in recovery costs).
237 The incentive effects of awarding damages against failed relators are similar to
the effects of fee-shifting and Rule 11 sanctions, which can reduce the number of suits
filed. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based
on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11,
25 J Legal Stud 371, 377-81 (1996) (finding that fee-shifting and Rule 11 sanctions may
not lead to optimal decisions regarding when to sue); Steven C. Salop and Lawrence J.
White, Economic Analysis of PrivateAntitrust Litigation, 74 Georgetown L J 1001, 101630 (1986) (addressing the effects of fee-shifting on filing and settlement); Thomas D.
Rowe Jr, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L J
651, 660-61 (discussing fee-shifting as a punishment for undesirable behavior).
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damages remains limited, however, relators with good claims
should not be substantially deterred from coming forward. Rather, they would be incentivized to act reasonably. Put another
way, courts evaluating relator self-help should think of monetary relief as similar to punitive damages. Monetary damages
should not be given simply to compensate the primary harm, but
rather to punish particularly egregious conduct and to deter
238
future instances of that conduct.
To see how this scheme might work, it is helpful to consider
a few of the cases discussed above. Monetary damages would be
ideal in a situation like that presented in Saini v International
Game Technology,2 39 in which the plaintiff, a recently terminated employee, took documents primarily so that he could obtain
new employment as an expert witness in a lawsuit against his
former employer. 240 Though the court enjoined further use of the
documents, 241 the former employee did not suffer any additional
harm and would presumably have taken the documents again if
given the chance. Monetary damages would deter this sort of
conduct by making the employee worse off than if he had never
taken the documents. Aware of this possible outcome, aspiring
relators would avoid behaving badly so as not to risk financial
harm to themselves.
In most cases, however, monetary damages would not be
necessary and would actually deter some valid whistleblowing.
For instance, in Zahodnick the relator began collecting evidence
of what he suspected was fraud while still employed with the
company and then kept that evidence after his resignation. 2 2 He
later used the documents to file an FCA retaliation claim. 243 The
court ultimately applied a contractual rule, barring the relator's
use of the documents. 244 Had the court awarded monetary damages
to the employer, it would have risked deterring future relators.
Any relator who, like Zahodnick, investigated in good faith but
was simply wrong would be subject to a penalty. Fearing this financial penalty for being wrong, some relators might not come
238 See Exxon Shipping Co v Baker, 554 US 471, 492-93 (2008) ("[T]he consensus
today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and
deterring harmful conduct.").
239 434 F Supp 2d 913 (D Nev 2006).
240 Id at 917--18.
241
242

Id at 925.
Zahodnick, 135 F3d at 913.

243 Id.
244

Id at 915.
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forward at all, even if fraud were actually occurring. Avoiding
monetary damages in such cases limits the downside risk to
failed relators and encourages them to act reasonably. Fraud
will still be reported, but with minimum damage to honest
employees.
CONCLUSION
A reasonableness test offers a solution to the current circuit
split over the handling of self-help discovery in FCA qui tam
cases. The current regime of two competing bright-line rules is
inconsistent, problematic, and probably inefficient. Without a
legislative or empirical judgment regarding the comparative
harms of fraud against the government and self-help discovery,
no court can be confident that it has adopted the preferable
bright-line rule, and one of the two rules must be wrong.
Adopting a reasonableness test modeled on the one proposed
by the Ninth Circuit in Cafasso solves these problems. Such a
test would allow judges to use their discretion to reach the preferable outcome in each case. If the court decided not to permit
the self-help discovery, it could then apply a sliding scale of
remedies, awarding only injunctive relief in all but the most extreme cases, in which damages would also be warranted. This
would incentivize reasonable relator conduct without deterring
good faith reporting of fraud. A reasonableness approach would
also produce uniform treatment of self-help discovery across federal statutory schemes and would be more sensitive to the competing policy concerns embodied in the FCA. In sum, a reasonableness test would unify the currently divided law and produce
less costly outcomes. It would also create the proper ex ante incentives, encouraging valid whistleblowing but discouraging excessively disruptive conduct by relators. It would, in short, make
FCA suits a bit more reasonable.

